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REPORT OF WORKING GROUP #8
Lisa A. Butler-Brust
Religious symbols displayed in courtrooms, law school classrooms,
lawyer's offices, and those worn by attorneys were the subject of Work
Group #8. Within each of these categories, the group identified the
range of options by first setting out the all or nothing positions. Issues
of free speech, the educational and societal import of cultural and his-
toric symbols, and free exercise of one's religion were juxtaposed
against seperation of church and state, the implications of taking reli-
gious symbols for governmental use, and disenfranchisement of liti-
gants by exclusion of historical/religious symbolism meaningful to
them. Balancing legal and ethical issues with pragmatism, the group
discarded as impractical both the notion of complete bleaching out of
religious symbolism for public institutions and that of uninhibited free
speech/free exercise of religion by attorneys in their work.
The Group discussed the issues surrounding the presence of reli-
gious symbols in courtrooms, law school classrooms, and lawyers' of-
fices. The Group began by discussing the current controversy
surrounding the judge in Alabama who has displayed a carving of the
Ten Commandments over the bench in his courtroom and has refused
to take it down, despite an order to do so from the Alabama Court of
Appeals. The judge contends that the United States and its justice
system were founded on the belief in God, and, therefore, the Ten
Commandments are a source of our laws and should be appropriately
symbolized in the courtroom. The Group thought that the biggest
problem with this display was the discrimination that some litigants
who appear before the judge may feel. A litigant who is a non-be-
liever may feel at a disadvantage because of her religious beliefs or
lack of religious beliefs when appearing before this judge who is sup-
posed to carry out the law in a religiously impartial way.
Even if the judge insisted that his actions in the courtroom would
remain impartial and that he would not discriminate based on a
party's religious beliefs, this display of the Ten Commandments still
presents problems. The judge argues that the Ten Commandments
are part of American history, and this religious history is reflected in
many of the traditions and rituals in a courtroom. For example, wit-
nesses in the courtroom swear to God on a Bible to tell the truth. The
Group distinguished between putting up new religious symbols and
tolerating those that already exist. Putting up new religious symbols,
as was done in this Alabama courtroom, is more objectionable than
leaving those religious symbols that have been displayed or practiced
for a long period of time. For example, painting over Moses and the
other religious symbols in the United States Supreme Court would be
objectionable. A complete "bleaching out" of religion, that is taking
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down all religious symbols in public spaces, was opposed by most
members of the Group. Removal of long standing religious symbols is
as offensive to believers as putting up new religious symbols is to non-
believers.
The Group also criticized this approach of allowing religious sym-
bols to be displayed, so long as they have been displayed for a period
of time and are generally viewed as traditional. One specific criticism
was that this approach is a type of "adverse possession" rule for deter-
mining whether a religious symbol is Constitutional-if it has been
there long enough, then it is not inherently religious. This approach is
unfair to religious sects that have not been as prevalent in the United
States as Christianity and Judaism. For example, under this approach
religious symbols of the Islam faith would never be permitted to exist
in public space, while Christian and Jewish symbols would be permit-
ted simply because these faiths have been more prevalent in Ameri-
can society in the past. This is disadvantageous to Muslims who would
never be able to create a religious tradition in this country. Addition-
ally, the theory that religious symbols can somehow be secularized
over time as a tradition or secularized because they are part of a larger
non-religious display may be offensive to some faiths. For example,
some in the Jewish faith may be disturbed by the concept that a meno-
rah can be secularized by being displayed alongside a Christmas tree.
Another discussion was whether lawyers should wear religious garb
or display religious symbols when they are practicing law. The Group
generally agreed that wearing religious garb or displaying religious
symbols in front of clients was acceptable and the lawyer's choice.
One member of the Group noted that the law sometimes constrains
this choice. For example, Sikh lawyers carry knives as part of their
religion, yet a Sikh lawyer would not be allowed to carry this religious
symbol in a courtroom. The Group also generally agreed that the
courtroom was a special setting and perhaps a lawyer should not be
permitted to wear religious garb or display religious symbols when
trying a case before a jury. Jurors may import an added level of integ-
rity to a lawyer who wears religious garb or displays religious symbols.
As officers of the court, lawyers should not be able to manipulate
their perceived integrity through religious garb or symbols. The
Group suggested uniforms for lawyers in court to prevent this from
happening. Defendants, however, should be able to wear whatever
they like, because they are not officers of the court.
The Group felt that it would be inappropriate for law school profes-
sors to wear religious garb or display religious symbols in the class-
room. As teachers, they occupy a more influential role towards
students than that of a lawyer towards a client. In addition, a client
has a choice in selecting a lawyer to represent her, while a law student
can not always choose her professors. The Group expressed varying
opinions as to whether religious garb or symbols were appropriate
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outside the classroom, for example worn or displayed in a professor's
office at the law school. Generally, religious symbols in a professor's
office were considered more appropriate than in the classroom. Those
members of the Group that felt that a professor's office was more of a
personal space than a public space had a higher tolerance for the dis-
play of religious symbols in a professor's office.
In summary, the Group acknowledged that a complete "bleaching
out" of all religious symbols was as unacceptable as allowing lawyers
to convey whatever religious message they wanted in all legal settings.
The Group, however, found it difficult to draw a line that distin-
guished when religious symbols were appropriate and when they were
not. Such a line depends on various factors, including: the setting in
which the symbol is displayed, e.g., courtroom, classroom, or office;
the length of time that the symbol has been displayed, i.e., has it ex-
isted for many decades, as in the mural in the Supreme Court, or has a
judge brought it into the courtroom recently; and the context of the
particular display, i.e., is it part of a larger non-religious display or is it
primarily meant to convey a religious message.
Notes & Observations
